The US District Court for the District of Maine awarded Dr. Kristine Thayer $1 in damages, plus recovery of attorney's fees and court costs after a jury found that Eastern Maine Medical Center (EMMC) took retaliatory action against her in violation of Maine's Whistleblower Protection Act (Thayer v. Eastern Maine Medical Center).
Thayer, a pediatric surgeon, told her supervisor that pediatric gastroenterologist Dr. Mohammed Tabbah was providing substandard patient care. Following the report, the hospital began an investigation of Dr. Thayer as a disruptive physician and the medical staff executive committee recommended that she attend anger management counseling, with the threat of disciplinary action for further disruptive behavior. Thayer voluntarily chose to leave EMMC.
At trial, the jury found that the supervisor's initiation of peer review was retaliation for Dr. Thayer's actions and a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act; however, they believe that that she suffered no injury that would entitle her to damages. Thayer filed an amended complaint for damages as well as the cost of court and attorneys' fees.
The district court ruled that Thayer was entitled to court and attorneys' fees. However, they limited her damages to $1, stating that the reinstatement of her professional reputation and the negative reputation cast on EMMC was an appropriate remedy that did not need to be supplemented by a further award of monetary damages.
Source: BNA
Showing posts with label Peer Review. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Peer Review. Show all posts
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Monday, July 19, 2010
Peer Review: Federal Court Says Credentialing Documents Not Covered by Colorado Statutory Privilege
Recently a ruling was made that a Colorado peer review privilege statute does not apply to documents generated by a hospital's credentialing committee and sought by a physician alleging he was wrongfully terminated (Ryskin v. Banner Health Inc., D. Colo., No. 09-cv-1864, 7/9/10).
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado said the state law did not bar Dr. Michael Ryskin from seeking documents from the Sterling Regional MedCenter credentialing committee because he provided sufficient allegations that the hospital failed to follow provisions of professional review and fair hearing plans that guaranteed him certain due process rights in the event of adverse actions affecting medical staff privileges.
Of greater importance, the court said, was the fact that the hospital did not appear to have followed its applicable practices for professional review and credentialing activities in Ryskin's case. Because compliance with the statutory procedural requirements is a prerequisite to asserting the privileges, they were not available.
Although the hospital argued that Ryskin may have been entitled to some due process rights if the credentialing committee had made an adverse recommendation against his medical privileges, and although it also argued that no adverse determination was ever made, the court rejected those arguments
The court concluded that, while the state law privileges are designed primarily to shield peer review materials from production in medical malpractice cases, Ryskin's action was not concerned with quality of care issues but was, rather, focused on determining the motives behind his termination.
In a conclusive decision from the court: “Plaintiff seeks not the conclusions of the relevant committees, but their motives. To shield the documents in this lawsuit would be to frustrate the search for truth."
Source: BNA's Health Care Daily 7/19/2010: Federal Court Says Credentialing Documents
Not Covered by Colorado Statutory Privilege
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado said the state law did not bar Dr. Michael Ryskin from seeking documents from the Sterling Regional MedCenter credentialing committee because he provided sufficient allegations that the hospital failed to follow provisions of professional review and fair hearing plans that guaranteed him certain due process rights in the event of adverse actions affecting medical staff privileges.
Of greater importance, the court said, was the fact that the hospital did not appear to have followed its applicable practices for professional review and credentialing activities in Ryskin's case. Because compliance with the statutory procedural requirements is a prerequisite to asserting the privileges, they were not available.
Although the hospital argued that Ryskin may have been entitled to some due process rights if the credentialing committee had made an adverse recommendation against his medical privileges, and although it also argued that no adverse determination was ever made, the court rejected those arguments
The court concluded that, while the state law privileges are designed primarily to shield peer review materials from production in medical malpractice cases, Ryskin's action was not concerned with quality of care issues but was, rather, focused on determining the motives behind his termination.
In a conclusive decision from the court: “Plaintiff seeks not the conclusions of the relevant committees, but their motives. To shield the documents in this lawsuit would be to frustrate the search for truth."
Source: BNA's Health Care Daily 7/19/2010: Federal Court Says Credentialing Documents
Not Covered by Colorado Statutory Privilege
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Utah Supreme Court Recognizes Negligent Credentialing as a Valid Claim
On May 14, the Utah Supreme Court recognized negligent credentialing as a valid cause of action in a legal claim against a hospital in Archuleta v. St. Mark's Hospital.
The plaintiff, Tina Archuleta, had undergone a laparotomy procedure performed by Dr. R. Chad Halversen at St. Mark's Hospital. Two days later, she was admitted to another facility, experiencing pain and complications from the procedure. Archuleta underwent six surgeries to correct the procedure.
Archuleta filed a suit against Halversen and St. Mark's Hospital. In her complaint against the hospital, she claimed that St. Mark's "failed to seek consult when appropriate, inadequately trained healthcare provider employees, negligently credentialed. . . [Dr.] Halversen and generally fell below the standard of care."
The district court dismissed her negligent credentialing claim, stating that such action was barred by the sections of the Utah Code that protect the dissemination of peer review information. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the district court was incorrect in its application of the code, ruling that "the immunity contemplated under the statue operates between a doctor whose credentials are under review and the suppliers of information and decision makers; it does not contemplate immunity between a patient and a hospital."
In its opinion, the Utah Supreme Court stated that there is a public interest in recognizing negligent credentialing claims because there is a "foreseeability of harm to patients where hospitals fail to properly investigate a doctor's qualifications" (citing Johnson v. Misericordia), and because of the "superior position [of hospitals] to monitor and control physician performance" (citing Domingo v. Doe).
To read the full opinion, click here:
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Archuleta2051410.pdf
The plaintiff, Tina Archuleta, had undergone a laparotomy procedure performed by Dr. R. Chad Halversen at St. Mark's Hospital. Two days later, she was admitted to another facility, experiencing pain and complications from the procedure. Archuleta underwent six surgeries to correct the procedure.
Archuleta filed a suit against Halversen and St. Mark's Hospital. In her complaint against the hospital, she claimed that St. Mark's "failed to seek consult when appropriate, inadequately trained healthcare provider employees, negligently credentialed. . . [Dr.] Halversen and generally fell below the standard of care."
The district court dismissed her negligent credentialing claim, stating that such action was barred by the sections of the Utah Code that protect the dissemination of peer review information. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the district court was incorrect in its application of the code, ruling that "the immunity contemplated under the statue operates between a doctor whose credentials are under review and the suppliers of information and decision makers; it does not contemplate immunity between a patient and a hospital."
In its opinion, the Utah Supreme Court stated that there is a public interest in recognizing negligent credentialing claims because there is a "foreseeability of harm to patients where hospitals fail to properly investigate a doctor's qualifications" (citing Johnson v. Misericordia), and because of the "superior position [of hospitals] to monitor and control physician performance" (citing Domingo v. Doe).
To read the full opinion, click here:
http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Archuleta2051410.pdf
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
Higher Standard of Review for Peer Review Malice Recognized by Supreme Court
The Supreme Court announced that it will not review a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that "clear and convincing evidence" is required to prove malice of peer reviewers seeking immunity under the Texas Medical Practice Act (TMPA).
The Court accepted the Fifth Circuit's standard after Dr. Royal Benson had argued that a "preponderance of the evidence" standard should be met, which is a lower standard of proof. Dr. Benson claimed that St. Joseph Regional Medical Center and members of its peer review committee should not be granted immunity under TMPA because the statute bars immunity if it can be proven that decisions were made with malicious intent.
Dr. Benson was denied reappointment by the peer review committee. He also alleged that the denial of privileges was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act because it caused injury to competition. The Fifth Circuit dismissed this claim.
Source: BNA
The Court accepted the Fifth Circuit's standard after Dr. Royal Benson had argued that a "preponderance of the evidence" standard should be met, which is a lower standard of proof. Dr. Benson claimed that St. Joseph Regional Medical Center and members of its peer review committee should not be granted immunity under TMPA because the statute bars immunity if it can be proven that decisions were made with malicious intent.
Dr. Benson was denied reappointment by the peer review committee. He also alleged that the denial of privileges was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act because it caused injury to competition. The Fifth Circuit dismissed this claim.
Source: BNA
Thursday, August 20, 2009
Peer Review Privilege Can Be Undermined by State Freedom of Information Law, According to Connecticut Court
The Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that peer review records may be subject to disclosure for use in a civil lawsuit under the provisions of the state's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
In its decision (Director of Health Affairs, University of Connecticut Health Center v. Freedom of Information Commission), the court noted that this ruling will not substantially affect the privacy of peer review records since most hospitals are private and therefore, are not subject to FOIA rules. The court also noted that while a party may be able to access this information during the discovery process to prepare for trial, peer review records are still privileged information that cannot be entered as evidence in a civil action.
Source: BNA
In its decision (Director of Health Affairs, University of Connecticut Health Center v. Freedom of Information Commission), the court noted that this ruling will not substantially affect the privacy of peer review records since most hospitals are private and therefore, are not subject to FOIA rules. The court also noted that while a party may be able to access this information during the discovery process to prepare for trial, peer review records are still privileged information that cannot be entered as evidence in a civil action.
Source: BNA
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